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Abstract—The increase of cyberattacks using IoT devices has
exposed the vulnerabilities in the infrastructures that make up
the IoT and have shown how small devices can affect networks
and services functioning. This paper presents a review of the
vulnerabilities of the wireless technologies that bear the IoT
and assessing the experiences in implementing wireless attacks
targeting the Internet of Things using Software-Defined Radio
(SDR) technologies. A systematic literature review was conducted.
The types of vulnerabilities and attacks that can affect the
wireless technologies that stand the IoT ecosystem and SDR
radio platforms were compared. On the IoT system model
layer, perception layer was identified as the most vulnerable.
Most attacks at this level occur due to limitations in hardware,
physical exposure of devices, and heterogeneity of technologies.
Future cybersecurity systems based on SDR radios have notable
advantages due to their flexibility to adapt to new communication
technologies and their potential for the development of advanced
tools. However, cybersecurity challenges for the Internet of
Things are so complex that it is needed to merge SDR hardware
with cognitive techniques and intelligent techniques such as deep
learning to adapt to rapid technological changes.
Index Terms—Internet of Things, Software Defined Ra-
dio(SDR), Cybersecurity, Radio communication, Cyberattack,
Vulnerabilities
I. INTRODUCTION
On September 5 and 6, 2019 a cyber-attack affected several
Wikipedia sites in Europe - including Germany, France,Italy
and Poland, at the same time as parts of the Middle East
[1].IoT devices were used to take down Wikipedia through
distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks. The IoT were
used to amplifying the potential cyberattack surface.According
to the World Economic Forum report, attacks on IoT devices
grew by more than 300% in the first half of 2019 [2], [3].
On May , 2018 the VPNFilter malware targets at least 500K
networking devices in 54 countries [4]. Home-office network
devices, as well as network-attached storage devices were
infected. VPNFilter exploited various vulnerabilities in several
models and brands of routers and network-attached storage
(NAS) devices. The malware capabilities identified including
data exfiltration, spying on traffic, and rendering the infected
device unbootable. The malware code overlaps with versions
of the BlackEnergy malware, which was responsible for mul-
tiple large-scale attacks that targeted devices in Ukraine.
On April 7, 2017, a cyberattack on the emergency system
in the city of Dallas, in the United States, triggered 156
emergency sirens at 11:40 p.m., causing panic and fear of
a possible terrorist attack [5].The case study carried out by
the company Bastille Networks [6], found that the attacker
exploited the vulnerability of the wireless infrastructure mak-
ing up the emergency system to control its operation and also
found that the United States has over 5000 similar emergency
systems distributed throughout different cities, universities,
military facilities and industries.
On October 21, 2016 [7], a denial-of-service cyber-attack
targeting Internet provider DynDNS caused problems for
sites such as Twitter, Netflix, Spotify, Airbnb, Reddit, Etsy,
SoundCloud and the New York Times, affecting much of the
United States of America. According to subsequent analyses
[8],thousands of IoT devices such as cameras and home routers
were used, which were violated in various ways. The traffic
volume of this attack has been the highest recorded so far: 1.2
Tbps; a similar event recorded previously had reached 620
Gbps.
These security incidents are an exemplify the vulnerability
of some of today’s communication systems. At a point in
history where society is moving rapidly towards technological
scenarios supported largely by the Internet of Things (IoT)
communications infrastructure [9], such threats represent a
global challenge.
The International Telecommunication Union estimates 25
billion connected devices for 2020 [10]; and according to the
Ericsson mobility report [11] by 2022 the number of connected
devices will be 29 billion, with a projected increase of 21%
between 2016 and 2022. [12] identifies potentially vulnerable
scenarios and describes risks in critical infrastructure such as
power distribution, SCDA, smart transport, medical care and
smart home automation. When analyzing the technological
infrastructure that supports the IoT [13], we find a diverse
ecosystem of wireless technologies, with rapid growth and
some gaps in the regulation of device-manufacturing pro-
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Risk assessment and analysis of the impact of cyberattacks
is a concern that goes beyond technical and academic sce-
narios. The OECD (Organisation for Economic Cooperation
and Development), in its Recommendation on Digital Security
Risk Management for Economical and Social Prosperity [14],
analyses the issue of digital security and its impact on the
economic development of countries. [15] estimates that 70%
of connected IoT devices have vulnerabilities. [16] analyses
the risks and the ways in which such events can affect the
operation of vital systems for people. In 2014, it was estimated
that the economic impact of cybercrime was 500 billion
dollars. By 2018, this figure had reached 600 billion [17].In
2021,cybercrime damages might reach US$6 trillion [2].
Some Governments, concerned about threats to their com-
munications infrastructures, have created special programs
to counter them. The United States government through the
Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) created the
Trusted Integrated Circuits program to develop technolo-
gies that ensure reliability in the manufacturing processes
of electronic devices used in military systems. Other coun-
tries are undertaking similar initiatives through cyber se-
curity agencies such as Agence nationale de la scurit des
systmes d’information (ANSSI) in France; Nationales Cyber-
Abwehrzentrum in Germany; and Defence Cyber Operations
Group in the United Kingdom.
A large part of IoT technologies are wireless and form an
ecosystem of radios designed from various communication
protocols [18]. The old radio systems required specific hard-
ware to operate in a very limited range of frequencies [19].
Modern radios are evolving towards Software-defined radio
technology (SDR), where the same hardware platform can
adapt and become a transmitter and/or receiver system oper-
ating under various technologies, by modifying the software’s
configuration parameters in the device. Although the devel-
opment of ADC-DAC converter manufacturing techniques
and FPGA-based processing systems have led to significant
improvements in hardware performance, there are still several
technical limitations to the production of the ideal SDR
radio device proposed by Joseph Mitola in 1999 [19]. [20]
presents an analysis of the first ten years of SDR technology
development, while [21] describes the evolution of trends in
SDR considering the last two decades.
The large growth of wireless devices for IoT development
also causes risks and vulnerabilities to increase. The types
of wireless attacks are varied and there is no single classifi-
cation. Among the best known are: spoofing, eavesdropping,
sidechannel, jamming, replay and spoofing. All of them are
based on exploiting the various vulnerabilities present in radio
devices or in their communication protocols.
The review made allows, firstly, to clarify the dimension of
the wireless ecosystem of the IoT, with its technologies and
protocols, and then the concepts related to radio technology
defined by software and the types of existing hardware and
software resources, as well as their characteristics and tech-
nical possibilities. It then addresses the concepts of wireless
cybersecurity, in order to finally identify the types of vulner-
abilities and attacks that can affect the wireless technologies
that make up the IoT ecosystem SDR radio platforms and
cognitive radio networks. In the document, the security aspects
related to SDR technology are analyzed in two ways: first
by identifying the vulnerabilities inherent to SDR devices
since the flexibility and reconfigurability of SDR hardware
make its adaptability very high, but they can also be affected
by attacks capable of modifying radio behavior. This aspect
is very important for the future of wireless systems, where
cognitive radio networks will be supported by reconfigurable
radios. The second aspect considered in the review was the
classification of various experiences in implementing wireless
attacks using commercial SDR radios, and the use of these
platforms as tools for the analysis of risks and vulnerabilities
in wireless systems. The contributions of the review are the
following:
• Classifying and identifying the technologies that make
up the wireless ecosystem of the Internet of Things, their
standards and operating frequencies.
• Contextualizing definitions and concepts related to SDR
technology and the various hardware architectures.
• Classifying the most common SDR hardware platforms
considering their main technical characteristics.
• Identifying the types of SDR radios and cognitive radio
networks vulnerabilities.
• Identifying the most common types of wireless vulnera-
bilities and IoT wireless ecosystem vulnerabilities.
• Understanding wireless attack implementation experi-
ences and vulnerability assessments for wireless tech-
nologies, and identifying the types of SDR radio plat-
forms used.
The document is organized as follows: section two presents
the context of the technologies that make up the wireless
ecosystem of the Internet of Things, their operating fre-
quencies and standards. Thereafter, section three includes
definitions of concepts related to software-defined radio, the
types of hardware architectures and a technical comparison
of the most commonly used SDR platforms. The fourth
section addresses issues related to wireless cybersecurity. This
includes classifying SDR radio vulnerabilities, common wire-
less vulnerabilities, and IoT wireless ecosystem vulnerabilities
and cognitive radio network vulnerabilities. This section also
describes various experiences in wireless attacks and wire-
less security deployments, and the analysis performed using
software-defined radio platforms. Experiences are identified
and classified according to the types of attacks implemented
and SDR platforms used are described. Finally, section five
includes an analysis on the most significant elements identified
from the review process carried out.
II. WIRELESS ECOSYSTEM
Figure 1 shows a classification based on [22] for some of
the wireless communication technologies used in the imple-
mentation of the Internet of Things, taking into account the
range of their scope. By classifying wireless technologies by
Fig. 1. Ecosystem of wireless technologies used for the IoT. Based on [22], Fig 2
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range, we can talk about technologies: of proximity, WPAN,
WFAN, WLAN, WNA and WWAN.
The frequency bands for the operation of each can be ap-
preciated, along with the corresponding standards. This tech-
nological scenario considers the technologies existing in 2019
and their evolution towards a 5G technologies-based future
ecosystem. [23], [24], [25] discuss several aspects related to
the evolution of these scenarios, their challenges, possibilities
and limitations. This set of technologies or ecosystem has
enabled the development of concepts such as Internet of
Things, Smart Cities or Smart grids. Some of them, such as
Bluetooth, 3GPP GSM,802.11g, NFC, have been massified by
their use in devices such as mobile phones, computers, access
control systems, sound systems, payment cards, etc., while
others such as ZigBee, Lora,802.11p, are regarded as emerging
technologies. In this context, with the rapid development of the
wireless ecosystem, enormous challenges arise, such as oppor-
tunistic use of spectrum, regulatory matters, interoperability
between technologies, quality of service and a key element:
system security [18].
III. SOFTWARE DEFINED RADIO
In 2009, the ITU-R International Telecommunication Union
Working Group 1B defined the term SDR (Software-Defined
Radio) for the 2012 World Radio communication Conference
[26], as: A radio transmitter and/or receiver employing a
technology that allows the RF operating parameters including,
but not limited to, frequency range, modulation type, or output
power to be set or altered by software, excluding changes to
operating parameters that occur during the normal pre-installed
and predetermined operation of a radio according to a system
specification or standard. Already in 1992, Joseph Mitola III
[27] had defined the term software Radio as: A software Radio
is a radio wave channel modulations waveforms are defined
in software.That is, waveforms are generated as sampled
digital signals, converted from digital to analog via wideband
DAC (Digital Analog Converter) and the possibly unconverted
form IF (Intermediate Frequency) to RF (Radio Frequency)
.The receiver, similar, employs a wideband ADC (Analog
to Digital Converter) that captures all the channels of the
radio node software. The receiver then extracts, down converts
and demodulated the channel waveform using software on a
general purpose processor.
A. SDR Hardware Platforms
The concept of SDR platforms arose with Mitola in 1992
[28].In 1996, at MIT, the SpectrumWare software radio project
was carried out, where a prototype receiver of a GSM base
station was developed [29].In 1999, SDR SpeakEasy I/II
radios were manufactured, for military use, and financed by
the US government.In 2004, the company Ettus was created
and the production of SDR-USRP hardware began; its use
has expanded and has become one of the most widely used
platforms nowadays [30], [20], [21].
Table I presents a summary of the technical characteris-
tics of some commercially available software-defined radio
platforms: The number of bits used by analog digital and/or
digital analog converters is regarded (DAC), as well as their
sampling rates, bandwidth and transmission, and/or reception
possibilities.
The increase in the sampling capabilities of converters
attests to the evolution of SDR platforms, which enables the
implementation of modern wireless communications standards
[30]. SpeakEasy used converter devices with sampling rates
in the order of 200 Kb/s for its manufacture in 1999 [31].The
USRP1, designed in 2004, has an ADC converter sampling
rate of 64 [MS/S], compared with the reference USRP X310
released to the market in 2016; the sampling rate is observed to
have increased to 200 [MS/s]. The evolution of the platforms
has also allowed the increase of radios’ frequency range. As
can be seen in the table I the frequency ranges reach 6 GHz.
Platform ADC
/DAC
[Bits]
ADC
/DAC
[MS/s]
Tx/Rx
Fmin-
Fmax
[MHz]
RTL [32] 8/- 3.2/- Rx 25-1750
FUNCube [33] 16/- 96KHz Rx 64-1700
Airspy-mini [34] 12/- 20/- Rx 24-1700
HackRF One [35] 8/10 20/20 Tx-Rx 1-6000
Pluto [36] 12/12 61.4/61.4 Tx-Rx 325-3800
BladeRF 2.0 Micro [37] 12/12 61.4/61.4 Tx-Rx 47-6000
USRP-1 [38] 12/14 64/128 Tx-Rx DC-6000
Nutaq PicoSDR [39] 12/12 80/80 Tx-Rx 56-6000
USRP-2 [38] 14/16 100/400 Tx-Rx DC-6000
USRP-N210 [38] 14/16 100/400 Tx-Rx DC-6000
WARP-V3 [40] 12/12 100/170 Tx-Rx 2400/5000
LimeRF LMS7002M
[41] 12/12 160/640 Tx-Rx 0.1-3800
USRP X310 [38] 14/16 200/800 Tx-Rx DC-6000
USRP N310 [38] 16/14 153.6/153.6 Tx-Rx 10-6000
AIR-T [42] 12/10 245.7/245.7 Tx-Rx 300-6000
CRIMSON [43] 16/16 370,16/2500,16 Tx-Rx 0.1-6000
TABLE I
SOFTWARE DEFINED RADIO PLATFORMS COMPARISON
In addition to improvements in the features of radio inter-
faces, SDR hardware has also evolved in increasing its compu-
tational capacity by integrating DSP and FPGAs devices into
its systems.The Xilinx Virtex 6 is used in SDR devices such as
PicoSDR, WARP v3; the X-Series USRP uses Xilinx Kintex 7
FPGAs and platforms such as CRIMSON [43] integrate an
FPGA-Arria V ST SOC and an ARM Cortex-A9 MP. The
AIR-T(Artificial Intelligence Radio - Transceiver ) platform
[42] combines a 2x2 SDR MIMO system with a 256-core
GPU Jetson TX2 on a single card.Its ADC and DAC converters
reach sample rates of up to 245.7 [MS/s]. Other platforms can
be classified in the low-cost hardware category such as RTL
[32], HackRF [35],AirSpy [34],FUNCube [33],BladeRF [37],
LimeRF [41] and Pluto [36]; These devices, along with free
software tools such as GNU Radio and driver integration for
SDR devices signal processing platforms such as Matlab and
Labview have enabled the development of software-defined
radio technology worldwide.
IV. CYBERSECURITY FOR WIRELESS
TECHNOLOGIES
To assess the vulnerability level of a system or technology,
the National Infrastructure Advisory Council (NIAC) [44]
established the Common Vulnerability Score System (CVSS)
[45]. [46] uses this classification to perform a vulnerability as-
sessment on Bluetooth low energy technology in IoT systems.
Moreover, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, through
the Office of Cybersecurity and Communications (CSC), set
up a mechanism to identify and classify attack patterns through
a public catalog known as CAPEC (Common Attack Pattern
Enumeration and Classification) [47].
A. MOST COMMON WIRELESS VULNERABILITIES
According to [48], the security basics for the operation of a
wireless network are confidentiality, integrity, availability and
access control. Confidentiality must ensure that network data
cannot be read by unauthorized users, while integrity detects
intentional or accidental changes to data being carried over the
network. Availability ensures that devices and users can use
the network and its resources when they need it, and access
control restricts resources to authorized users only.
The company Bastille Networks conducted a classification
of the top 10 vulnerabilities of wireless systems [49].Table II
describes each one.
Vulnerability Description
Rogue cell tow-
ers
It use IMSI catchers or Stingrays. A mobile
cell allow spoof an cellular communication.
The attacker can heard and read SMS.
Rogue WiFi
Hotspots
The WiFi hotspots can be used to deploy man
in the middle attacks. Is possible keep watch
on network traffic or stole user’s credentials.
Bluetooth Data
exfiltration
It uses a mobile device with Bluetooth that
avoids network controls by means of internet
access across the cellular network.
Eavesdroping
/ surveillance
devices
Eavesdropping devices voice-activated, with
FM or GSM transmission. Devices are hidden
in offices or meeting rooms.
Vulnerable
wireless
peripherals
keystroke injection attacks. It uses the weak-
ness of wireless keyboards and/or mouses with-
out data encryption.
Unapproved
cellular device
presence
Unapproved cellular device use in restricted
areas.
Unaproved
wireless
cameras
Unapproved wireless cameras are a security
breach.
Vulnerable
wireless
building
controls
Home automation devices with by default un-
secured configurations.
Unapproved
IoT Emitters
Devices like thermostats or wireless sensors
inside the buildings using Technologies like
Zigbee or LoRa with long-range coverage.
Vulnerable
building alarm
systems
Security systems elements like door sensors,
motion detectors can be sensitive to jammer
attacks using software defined radios
.
TABLE II
WIRELESS VULNERABILITIES ACCORDING TO THE BASTILLE NETWORKS
CLASSIFICATION [50]
B. SDR radios vulnerabilities
The types of wireless attacks are varied, [51] presents a clas-
sification of attacks targeting SDR tactical radios, while [48],
considers attacks with SDR radios within the Cognitive Radio
Network Vulnerability Classification (CRNs). [52] analyzes
the taxonomy of threats to cognitive radio networks by taking
into account the layers of the OSI model for classification.
Other studies focus specifically on the detailed analysis of a
specific type of attack and/or vulnerability, such as [53] where
jamming-type attacks are analyzed.
The applicability of the reconfigurable radios concept has
been proven in areas as demanding as tactical communications
[51].However, there are technical factors such as power con-
sumption, which restrict for their implementation to mobile
devices. However, one of the vital aspects for their massifica-
tion is to ensure that systems based on SDR technologies are
protected against malicious codes [54].
The role of software-defined radio technology can be ana-
lyzed in several ways: firstly by considering the vulnerabilities
of SDR radio platforms that can be exploited to affect their
operation. A second approach arises from the use of SDR
hardware for the generation of wireless attacks, which can
affect the operation of various types of radio communication
infrastructure, taking advantage of the vulnerabilities in proto-
cols or technologies of the various radio ecosystems. The third
aspect has to do with the potential of SDR technology for the
development of diagnostic and control tools for cyber-threats
and wireless cyber-attacks.
Figure 2 presents a classification of the types of wireless
attacks targeting software-defined radios taking into account
the work done by [51]. The study considers vulnerabilities
in tactical radios with software-defined radio technology. The
authors present five different types of attacks: radiocontrol,
personification, unauthorized data modifications, unauthorized
data access and denial of service. Each of these typologies
group a set of types of attacks and each of them arises from
exploiting some vulnerabilities present in the system. Each of
the elements of this structure is described in detail below.
C. IoT wireless ecosystem vulnerbilities
Table III shows the classification of vulnerabilities of the
Internet of Things according to a layer model described in
[18].The three-level model considers: perception, transport and
application. In the perception layer are physical IoT devices;
various types of transducers obtain the data and devices are
collected through wireless ecosystem technologies, such as
those shown in Figure 1. Generally, the devices used do
not have high computing power due to limitations in power
consumption or manufacturing costs.The transport layer is
responsible for transmitting the information obtained in the
perception layer to some of the processing systems, using
access networks such as 3G, WiFi, ad hoc or the Internet. The
application layer provides the services required by users. At
this level, solutions such as smart-cities, smart-healthcare, etc
are implemented. An application sublayer allows to manage
all types of derivative services such as performing intelligent
computing, implementing localization services, or serving as
an interface with cloud computing systems.
At each level, the authors identify a set of vulnerabilities.
According to the analysis, it is considered that the level of
perception is the least secure due to the physical exposure
of IoT devices, hardware limitations and heterogeneity of
technologies and where the following types of attacks can
occur: physical, impersonation, denial of service ,and routing
and data transit.
Layer Vulnerability
Application
Data jailbreak
Denial-of-service attacks
Malicious code injection
Transport
Routing attacks
Denial-of-service attacks
Data transit attacks
Perception
Physical attacks
Spoofing
Denial-of-service attacks
Routing attacks
Data transit attacks
TABLE III
IOT WIRELESS VULNERABILITIES, ACCORDING TO [18]
Perception layer attacks may be: physical, impersonation,
denial of service, routing, and data traffic attacks.
D. Attacks on Cognitive radio networks
Table IV shows a classification for the types of attacks
on cognitive radio networks according to the classification
made by [48]. The vulnerabilities of cognitive radio systems
relate to two of the main characteristics in this technology: its
cognitive capacity and its reconfigurability. In the first case,
attacks seek to emulate primary transmitters and/or transmit
false observations of the spectrum sensing process. In the
second scenario, by installing a malicious code, an attacker
can take control of the radio.
Type of attack Layer Description
Primary user emu-
lation Physical
Signals emulation of primary
transmitter
spectrum sensing
data falsification
,(SSDF) [55]
Physical Wrong observations concern-ing to spectrum sensing
Common control
channel
Medium
access
Spoofing , conges-
tion,jamming
Beacon falsitication Mediumaccess
Disruption of synchroniza-
tion between IEEE 802.22
WRANs
Cross-Layer All layers Advanced attacks across mul-tiple layers
Software Defined
Radio All layers
Manipulation of hardware
and/or software on Software
Defined Radios
TABLE IV
ATTACKS ON COGNITIVE RADIO NETWORKS, BASED ON [48]
Cognitive networks, by their nature, are also exposed to the
vulnerabilities and attacks inherent to wireless networks and
cognitive radios, for they are built using SDR radios and that
makes them vulnerable to the same type of threats to which
software-defined radio devices are exposed.
Fig. 2. Wireless attack classification, based on [51]
Wireless
attacks 
classification
Radiocontrol
Software 
Injection
Buffer overflow
Waveform download
Start-up
Personification
Replay
Authentication 
break
GPS Spofing
Unauthorized modification of data
Software Injection
Hardware Injection
Hardware Trojans
Device clonig
Unauthorized data access
Hardware Injection
Software Injection
Traffic analysis attacks
Side-channel attacks
Fault based attacks
Social engineering attacks
Denial of service
Hardware Injection
Software Injection
Jamming
Flooding
E. Cybersecurity experiences with SDR
Table V presents a compendium of cases where SDR
technology has been used to perform cybersecurity analyses
on wireless technologies such as GSM, LTE, DECT, RFID,
ACARS, ADS-B, LoRa, BLE, IEEE 802.11, IEEE 802.15.4,
NFC or on communication systems with drones and vehicles;
some of them are part of the wireless ecosystem of the Internet
of things.The table specifies the type of SDR radio platform
used and the type of attack or vulnerability implemented.
1) Spoofing attacks: This type of attack is also known
as man in the middle, and seeks to impersonate some of
the elements in communication by taking advantage of the
weaknesses that may exist in the protocols. Impersonated tech-
nologies may be highly varied. [56] shows the development
of a drone detection system by analyzing the characteristics
of wireless signals. [57] performs an analysis on aeronautical
communications technology ACARS (Aircraft Communica-
tion Addressing and Reporting System) and FANS1/A (Future
Air Navigation System, using USRP B200 radios to gener-
ate messages, seeking to assess the impact of this type of
attack on air safety. [58] assesses the vulnerability of wireless
communication used in automatic air pressure measurement
systems on the wheels of vehicles, Tire Pressure Monitoring
System, a technology required by the National Highway Trafic
Safety Administration in the United States. A USRP N210
was used to capture, analyze and impersonate the signals. [59]
designed an attack against an indoor location system based on
frequency modulations using a USRP B100 and GNU Radio
platform, in order to evaluate the system’s vulnerabilities.
[60] explores methods for mitigating GNSS(Global Navigation
Satellite System) signage spoofing attacks using SDR radios
and algorithms implemented in FPGAs.
Experiments concerning GSM technology vulnerability
analysis are presented in [62] and [63] where USRP radios
such as B210 or N210 are used to impersonate a GSM
base radio. [64], [66] and [65] show the implementation
of an IMSI-catcher or stingray device using a USRP B210
radio and OpenBTS [79]. [67] describes vulnerability tests
for LTE network access protocols using USRP B200 and
OpenLTE radio [80]. The results show two different types of
vulnerabilities evaluated: the first one makes it is possible to
obtain the precise location of a device using GPS coordinates
or True range multilateration from the signal intensity reported
by the cell. The second test showed the generation of a (DoS)
attack targeting an LTE device.
2) Eavesdropping attacks: [70] introduces a method to
prevent eavesdropping attacks on Near Field Communication
(NFC) devices. It employs a USRP N210 radio to generate
variable signals as to amplitude, frequency, or phase and
introduces additional bits to prevent an attacker from identify-
ing NFC message sequences. [69] explains an attack against
a communication system with Digital Enhanced Cordless
Telecommunication technology (DECT, using USRP SDR
radios and RTL-SDR [32] operating in a frequency range from
Vulnerability, attack or analysis Technology, objective Hardware References
Spoofing Drones USRP [56]
Spoofing ACARS, FANS1/A USRP B200 [57]
Spoofing Vehicular Security (TMPS protocol) USRP N210/ [58]
Spoofing FM-based indoor localization. USRP B100/WBX [59]
GPS Spoofing GNSS USRP N210 [60]
Man in the middle IoT(Bluetooth 2.1) USRP 2 [61]
Man in the middle GSM USRP B200 [62] [63]
IMSI catcher GSM USRP-N210/WBXUSRP1
[64] [65]
[66]
Location leaks; denial of service LTE USRP B210 [67]
Eavesdropping ADS-B RTL 2832U [68]
Eavesdropping DECT USRP N210 RTL2832U [69]
Eavesdropping Near Field Communication (NFC) USRP N210 [70]
Protocols implementation LoRaWan, BLE, IEEE802.11,IEEE802.15.4 USRP E310 [71]
TEMPEST Computer display PXI-e 5665 USRPN210/WBX [72] [73]
Side channel Decryption AES-128 on 32 bits mi-crocontroller USRP2,RTL 2832U [74] [75]
Penetration Testing Tactical Radio Networks HackRF One [76]
Replay RFID USRP N210/SBX [77]
Jamming OFDM NI USRP 2921 [74] [75]
vulnerabilities analysis on physical layer LTE USRP N210 [78]
TABLE V
CASES OF ATTACKS, VULNERABILITIES, OR CYBERSECURITY ANALYSIS WITH SDR TECHNOLOGY
1880 to 1930 MHz. The developed system enabled protocol
analysis and recovery of G-encoded voice signals G726. [68]
describes the ADS-B- aerial positioning signals-demodulation
process (Automatic Dependent Surveillance Broadcast using
an SDR-RTL device. [81] shows the vulnerability of various
types of wireless keyboards and mouses that work with
uncoded wireless technologies, thus exposing passwords, per-
sonal information, bank details, etc. [82] describes the process
of decoding and analyzing the LoRa technology protocol using
a USRP B210 radio, GNU Radio and Python.
3) Sidechannel attacks: [73] describes a TEMPEST-type
side-channel attack for the reconstruction of images from radio
frequency signals captured by a log periodic antenna and an
SDR-USRP radio platform. [83] describes the physical prin-
ciples of a TEMPEST attack, where imaging on a monitor is
analyzed. [72] presents the results of reconstructing the images
of various types of monitors, reaching a distance of 46 meters,
using a directive antenna and the National Instruments PXi-E
5665 hardware. [84] shows the development of a sensor that
detects a variations of electromagnetic fields near processing
devices for the purpose of detecting possible attacks.
4) Jamming attacks: [74] analyzes the effects of a
jamming attack targeting an OFDM communication system,
and analyzes metrics such as BER, MER and EVM. In the
implementation of the testbed, NI USRP 2921 radios were
used. [75] an OFDMA system was implemented using USRP
NI 2921 radios that allowed to measure performance against
jamming attacks. [85] describes a method to mitigate the effect
of a jamming attack using beamformig techniques; USRP2 and
GNU Radio radios were used in the proof of concept.
F. SDR as a cybersecurity tool
The potential of Software-defined radio technology as a tool
for analysis in cybersecurity is very high, especially when
considering its cognitive possibilities. Cybersecurity analysis
requires the use of techniques to assess the vulnerability
of systems using procedures framed within ethical hacking.
One of the techniques, known as systems penetration tests or
pentest, allows to establish if there are vulnerabilities or if the
defenses of a system are enough. The results of these tests
help improve network security. One of the most commonly
used tools for these procedures is Kali-Linux [86]; which
is Linux distribution that includes support for some SDR
platforms such as RTL, HackRF, UHD hardware and Funcube.
The technologies included in the tool are limited to Wi-Fi,
Bluetooth and NFC. In [87] the authors describe the tool
for penetration testing Scapy, developed in Python language,
which allows capturing, decoding and building packages for
protocols such as 802.15.4, ZWave and Wireless M-Bus using
a USRP B210 device. [76] describes a set of tests to identify
vulnerabilities in military radio networks. SDR USRP and
HackRF One devices are used as radio platforms. Bastille Net-
works [49] is a company engaged in identifying risks in what
they call the Internet of radios. For the development of their
cybersecurity audit services, they have developed and patented
their own tools to diagnose or control cybersecurity threats:
Collaborative Bandit Sensing; Bayesian Device Fingerprinting
and Distributed Tomographic Localization.These tools were
developed from software-defined radio devices. [88] describes
the PENTOS tool, designed to perform penetration testing on
IoT devices, but limited to Wi-Fi and Bluettoth technologies.In
[89] the authors describe the design and implementation
of the EZPro software tool, which enables the testing and
evaluation of tactical communications against jamming, PU
Emulation, protocol emulation and SSDF (Spectrum Sensing
Data Falsification) attacks.
V. OVERVIEW AND DISCUSSION
Figure 1 shows the magnitude of the IoT wireless ecosys-
tem, operating frequencies, and standards. It shows sev-
eral emerging technologies based on the 802.15.4 stan-
dard, such as: Wi-sun (802.15.4e), Thread, ZigBee NAN,
ISA100.11a, OnRamp, Wireless Hart, MiWi, Positive Train
ctrl (802.15.4p) and 802.15.4m. Another set of emerging WiFi-
based technologies was identified, to wit, 802.11ac, 802.11ad,
802.11ah (HaLow), 802.11p (WAVE), 802.11af (Super Wi-
Fi or WhiteFi). One of the major fields of development
and competition among manufacturers is LPWA (Low Powe
Wide Area) networks, where there are two large unlicensed
LPWA groups that group technologies such as: LoRa, SigFox,
Telensa and OnRamp, and a second LPWA-licensed group
encompassing mobile technologies based on LTE and GSM
such as NB-IoT and EC-GSM-IoT.
Table I shows the technical characteristics of the most
common software-defined radio platforms, taking into account
the number of bits used in ADC and DAC converters, their
frequency ranges, transmission and/or reception capabilities
and sampling rates. SDR technology has evolved thanks to the
development of converter manufacturing techniques, moving
from sampling rates in the order of 200 [Kb/s] used in 1999
to rates of 200 [MS/s] in devices manufactured in 2016.
SDR hardware is in full development; recent platforms such
as CRISOM [43] have ADC sampling rates of 370.16 [MS/s]
and 2500,16 [MS/s] for DAC, plus an ARM Cortex-A9 MP
processor and FPGA-Arria V ST SOC. Other SDR platform
developments integrate processing capabilities for working
with deeplearning techniques, such as the AIR-T (Artificial
Intelligence Radio - Transceiver) platform composed of a
2x2 SDR MIMO system with a 256-core Jetson TX2 GPU.
Improvements in conversion rates and increased computing
power make it possible to process the large flow of I/Q samples
and the implementation of modern wireless communications
standards.
Several types of wireless system attacks and vulnerabilities
were identified. Figure 2 presents a classification of the types
of wireless attacks for SDR radios. Table II describes the most
common wireless vulnerabilities, according to the company
Bastille Networs.Table IV, describes the types of attacks
against cognitive radio networks.Table III presents IoT’s var-
ious wireless vulnerabilities according to a three-tier model
proposed by [18]. The literature identifies the perception level
as the most vulnerable, exposed to physical, impersonation,
and routing and data traffic attacks, due to limitations in
hardware, physical exposure of devices and heterogeneity of
technologies. One of the efforts to develop solutions related
to improving manufacturing processes is the DARPA-funded
Trusted Integrated Circuits for the design of technologies to
ensure the reliability of hardware used in military systems.
The variety of SDR platforms is increasingly wide, as seen
in table I, which has allowed to democratize knowledge in
software-defined radio technology. Table V shows various im-
plementation cases of wireless attacks using software-defined
radio technology.The most commonly used radio platforms
for this purpose are the USRP. Among the most common
implementations are: spoofing, Eavesdropping, side channel,
jamming, replay. The implementation of pentesting tools that
show the potential of SDR technology for the development of
cybersecurity tools was identified as well.
The research challenges related to the security of IoT Tech-
nologies are manifold, considering the heterogeneous charac-
teristics of wireless technologies and the lack of standards for
manufacturing secure IoT devices.
Future systems based on SDR radios have great advantages
due to their flexibility to adapt to new communication tech-
nologies, but this very flexibility poses great risks. It is still
unclear how to prevent software in radios from being modified
or what strategies are most convenient for the protection of
software and hardware of devices.
SDR platforms can operate in a frequency range from DC
to 6 GHz, a range where there is a high percentage of current
communication technologies and also have reasonable process-
ing capabilities. However, the potential of the technology lies
in the software being developed and the processing techniques
implemented, wherefore it is important to consider that the
design of solutions aimed at cybersecurity in wireless systems
is a complex issue that involves areas of knowledge such as
digital signal processing, communications systems, networks
and communication protocols, signal propagation, antennas
and microwave systems, among others.
Cyber security challenges for the Internet of Things are so
complex that software-defined radio technology itself cannot
be considered as a solution. SDR technology can be seen
as a tool that can be combined with cognitive techniques
and intelligent techniques such as deeplearning, which can be
easily adapted to rapid technological changes.In this sense,
the most ambitious initiative undergoing development is the
DARPA Spectrum Collaboration Challenge [90], a challenge
designed to be carried out over a period of three years (2017-
2019).It seeks to apply artificial intelligence techniques to
expand the capabilities of software-defined radio technology. It
uses the Colosseum infrastructure, which is a laboratory built
at the Applied Physics Laboratory (APL) at Johns Hopkins
University, composed of 256 USRP radios and a set of servers
with GPU processing capabilities.
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